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1 Figure captions
Fig. 1. Normalized volatility averaged over 40 runs (generated by standard
MG for N = 101, during t = 10000 iterations after stationary regime has been
attained t0 = 10000) as a function of memory size and fraction of players using
real history information.
Fig. 2. Normalized complexity as a function of memory size and fraction of
players using real history information. Data were obtained under the same
conditions as in Fig.1. The inset shows projection of complexity on the memory
plane for real (below) and invented history (above) players.
Fig. 3. Normalized complexity of the binary string of outcomes of length 1000
bits, averaged over 40 runs. For each value of N , memory m was varied in
α = 2m/N .
Fig. 4. Entropy Hµ for standard MG as a function of α = P/N. Probability
pµ was evaluated by series expansion of erfc function. For each fixed memory
size parameter α was varied by changing the number of players. Following a
maximum value of 1, Hµ starts decreasing at α ∼ 0.34, the value at phase
transition.
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Quantifying Complexity in the Minority
Game
Milan Rajkovic´, Zoran Mihailovic´
Vincˇa Institute of Nuclear Sciences P.O. Box 522, 11001 Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Abstract
A Lempel-Ziv complexity measure is introduced into the theory of a Minority Game
(MG) in order to capture some features that volatility, one of the central quantities
in this model of interacting agents, is not able to. Extracted solely from the binary
string of outcomes of the game complexity offers new and valuable information on
collective behavior of players. Also, we show that an expression for volatility may
be included in the analytical expression for complexity.
PACS: 02.50.Le, 05.40.-a, 05.65.+b, 87.23.Ge
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Introduction
The Minority Game has been a topic of considerable recent attention as a
paradigm of a complex adaptive system where individal actions of each partic-
ipant (agent) give rise to cooperative effects reflected in the collective behavior
of the whole population of players. The model is also a valuable tool for study-
ing financial markets as particular cases of an interacting agent systems. The
central issue of this work is the complexity of a binary string which represents
outcome of the game, and its role in the understanding of collective behavior
of players. The Lempel-Ziv complexity is used as a measure of complexity and
it turns out that it captures many features otherwise eluding usual analysis.
The paper is organized such that first a brief presentation of this complex-
ity measure is given followed by an introduction to the setup of the Minority
Game (MG). The relationship between phase transitions, symmetry breaking
and complexity is also presented in this section followed by a comparison with
a similar work on physical complexity in MG. Finally we discuss results and
their relevance in explaining collective behavior of players.
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1 The Complexity Measure of Lempel and Ziv
According to the widely accepted notions of complexity [1, 2] the complexity
of a string of zeros and ones (i.e. a binary string) is given by the number of
bits of the shortest computer program which can generate the string. From
the pool of all possible programs Lempel and Ziv [3] have chosen the ones that
involve only two operations: copying and inserting, and instead of calculating
the length of the programs the calculation is focused on a single number c(n)
which is a useful measure of this length. Very briefly the algorithm consists in
scanning a given n-digit sequence from left to right and at each point of the
sequence a test is performed to check whether the rest of the sequence may be
reconstructed by simple copying or whether one has to insert new digits. The
number of production steps reflected in the number of newly inserted digits
represents a complexity of a binary string. Details of the algortihm may be
found in the original paper of Lempel and Ziv [3]. In order to shed more light on
the results we shall consider some analytic features of c(n). The complexity of
a binary string of length n in the limit of large number of uncorrelated random
digits tends to
lim
n→∞
c(n) = cR(n) ≡ n/ log2 n.
cR(n) hence represents the asymptotic value of complexity of a binary random
string 1 . Naturally in the case when probabilities of finding each of two digits
in a binary representation, say 1 and 0, are different from 0.5 we would expect
the complexity to be smaller than in the case when probabilites of finding
both digits are the same. In this case c(n) tends to [3, 4]
lim
n→∞
c(n) = H(p)
n
log
2
n
= −[p log
2
p+ (1− p) log
2
(1− p)] n
log
2
n
, (1)
where H(p) is known as the source entropy. Clearly this quantity is maximal
for p = 0.5 and once p and H(p) are determined it can be tested wheather
deviation of limn→∞[c(n)/cR(n)] from 1 is due to the fact that H(p) differs
from 1 (and the string is still as random as possible) or, as is the case when
limn→∞[c(n)/cR(n)] < H(p), due to the presence of correlations in the string.
2 Minority Game
Minority game [5] consists of N players trying at each time step to be in mi-
nority taking an action ai(t) = ±1, where, for example, 1 may be interpreted
1 We normalize all our numerically obtained complexity values by the maximal
complexity of a random string evaluated by averaging over 100 000 random samples
whose length corresponds to the length used in simulations.
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as buying and −1 as selling an asset. The choice is made based on the informa-
tion stored as a binary time series of the last m actions taken by the minority
µt = (χt−1, ..., χt−m). Each player has at his disposal the same number s (but
in general different) of strategies among the S possible strategies, denoted by
s±, which give a prediction for the next outcome of the game based on the
history of the last m outcomes. Since there are 2m possible histories there
are S = 22
m
possible strategies. Each strategy is dynamically assigned a vir-
tual payoff based on its performance and at each time step every player uses
his most successful strategy in terms of the highest payoff (highest −ai(t)A(t)
where the difference in the population of agents choosing the + and the − sign
at time t is A(t) =
∑N
i ai(t)). Therefore, this interaction rewards the minority
of agents (those who took the action ai(t) = −sign A(t)), and hence the name
minority game. If a player i follows his s - th strategy and the history infor-
mation is µ his action is denoted by aµs,i. The variance σ of A(t) (volatility
in financial context) represents one of the most interesting observables since
the smallest value attained by σ represents the maximal payoff distribution to
agents and minimal global waste of resources by the community of agents.
3 Complexity in the Minority game
3.1 Phase transition, summetry breaking and complexity
The MG undergoes a second order phase transition with symmetry breaking
as the control parameter α = 2m/N is varied [6, 10]: the system is in the sym-
metric phase (temporal average of A(t) conditional to µ(t) = µ equals 0, i.e.
〈Aµ〉 = 0 ) for α < αc and it is in the asymmetric phase for α > αc. In other
words in the symmetric phase both actions are taken by the minority with
the same frequency while in the asymmetric phase the minority prefers one
action over the other. Moreover, for α < αc all players use all their available
strategies while for α > αc a finite population of players uses only one strategy
(analogous to spontaneous magnetization in the spin formalism). It has been
suggested that behavior of σ does not depend on the real history of the game
[7], however it was shown that this assertion is true only in the symmetric
phase [8]. Additionally, volatility was criticized for its insensitivity to the real
history of the game and another measure based on the algorithmic complexity
was suggested [11]. Actually, in reference [11] the physical complexity (non
normalized Shannon entropy) of substrings of the string of outcomes is eval-
uated which is equal to zero for random sequences, and the effect of memory
size on the degree of randomness was in the focus of the study. On the other
hand the Lempel-Ziv complexity is maximal for white noise and the focus of
our work lies in proving that this complexity measure may be used to detect
phase transitions and other information about players and the game in general
3
that can not be obtained by using volatility alone. From our point of view also,
volatility is inferior in many aspects to the complexity measure of Lempel and
Ziv, or variations of it, however due to its important role in theory of spin
glass systems which are analogous to the setup of MG, it would be useful if it
appears in the analytic expression for complexity. In order to clearly illustrate
the advantage of using the complexity measure of Lempel and Ziv, we numer-
ically simulate a game with two types of players: those who use real history in
selecting an optimal strategy and those who use assigned invented (random)
history at each time step. The behavior of σ2 is shown in Fig. 1. Note that in
this case too there is a second order phase transition with symmetry break-
ing and two phases of the game can be clearly distinguished. However, when
the game is played by only one group of players the graph of σ2 vs. memory
is qualitatively the same while the graph of complexity, presented in Fig. 2
clearly shows the difference. Specifically, when the game is played solely by
players using invented history no phase transition is detected and complex-
ity is practically constant in the complete range of memory values (inset of
Fig. 2). When only players using real history take part in the game there is
a phase transition at m = 5 indicated by the maximum value of complexity.
Comparing the minimum value of volatility with respect to memory size with
the corresponding maximum value of complexity we may expect that maxi-
mal collaboration among the players (and minimal global waste) is achieved
very close to the maximum value of complexity. Maximal collaboration is an
inherently complicated occurrence considering the fact that none of the play-
ers are aware of actions taken by other participants in the game. Based on
these findings we may add that history is relevant! An important information
conveyed by complexity is its ability to distinguish types of players involved
in the game based on the information contained only in the binary string of
outcomes. In the economic context this would mean that such inference may
be obtained from the direction of the sign of the order imbalance, i.e. from
returns. In addition, this finding supports the intermediate version of the ef-
ficient market hypothesis, namely that a number of important informations,
including the ones that are not available to the players (agents) playing the
game (taking part in the financial market activity), are reflected in the out-
come (price index) at each moment of time. One more important feature is
that the maximum value of complexity (an indication of phase transition) is
independent of memory as indicated in Fig. 3, where complexity is presented
as a function of the usual order parameter α = P/N ≡ 2m/N, with all players
relying on the true history of the game. Note that for each maximal value of
complexity the order parameter value is ∼ 0.34, a universally accepted value
at phase transition.
4
3.2 Complexity and Entropy
Inspired by the expression (1) for source entropy, we introduce the following
entropy function
Hµ = − 1
P
∑
µ
[pµ log pµ + (1− pµ) log(1− pµ)], (2)
where P is the state space of all histories of size m, i.e. P = 2m, and the
summation is over the histories. We also assume that the probabilities figuring
in the above expression depend on the history of the outcomes of the game.
Namely, the probability pµ represents the probability of finding a minority
sign at = −sign At provided a specific history of outcomes occurred. Hence,
it is a conditional probability
pµ = Prob {A(t) > 0 | µ(t) = µ}.
In the limit of large N , Aµ is a gaussian variable with average 〈Aµ〉 and
variance 〈(Aµ)2〉 - 〈Aµ〉2. A calculation yields
pµ =
1
2
erf c
| 〈Aµ〉 |√
2(〈(Aµ)2〉 − 〈Aµ〉2)
≃ 1
2
− 1√
2pi
1√
σ2
h
− 1
, (3)
where σ2 = 〈(Aµ)2〉,and 〈Aµ〉2 = h, and where we have expanded the erfc
function to linear order under the assumption that 〈Aµ〉 ≪ V ar(Aµ). Conse-
quently, this entropy expression contains both σ2 and h keeping the analogy
with the spin glass systems (the dynamcis of the Minority Game is similiar
to spin dynamics with hamiltonian σ2) [10]. In Fig. 4 we show the entropy
given by expression (2) for standard MG as a function of α = P/N. A striking
feature of this graph immediately draws attention, namely for an initial range
of the order parameter α the entropy is maximal (≃ 1) and then it starts de-
creasing at α ≃ 0.34, the value of the control parameter at phase transition. In
the symmetric phase of the game, when both actions are taken by the minority
with same frequency the entropy is maximal and close to 1, and this result
may be easily predicted using expressions (2) and (3). However when minority
starts preferring one action over the other the entropy starts decreasing and
a phase transition occurs. Since the Lempel Ziv algorithm is optimal in the
sense that at least for ergodic and infinite sequences complexity approaches
the Shannon entropy [9], it is of interest to compare the Shannon entropy
and the entropy given in expression (2) in order to shed more light on the
difference between the complexity shown in Fig. 3 and the entropy presented
in Fig. 4. Numerically, the Shannon entropy from a finite binary sequence of
length N is usually estimated by calculating all block (subsequence or ”word”)
probabilities p(s1, ..., sn) by the standard likelihood estimate,
pˆn = ns1...sn/N (4)
5
where ns1...sn is the number of occurrences of the block s1, ..., sn, and si ∈
{0, 1}, and where the expression for the Shannon entropy is
HS = lim
N→∞
− 1
N
∑
{si}
pn(s1, ..., sn) log pn(s1, ..., sn). (5)
Hence, the probabilities (3) and (4) figuring in the entropy expressions (2) and
(5) respectively, are inherently different. As a final remark we may add that in
the context of MG complexity may be linked to Nash equilibria, collaborative
behavior among players and bounded rationality [12].
4 Summary
A complexity measure based on the algorithm of Lempel and Ziv offers new
evidence that history is relevant in MG, and that maximal complexity corre-
sponds to the maximal collaboration among players. It reaches its maximum
at phase transition value of the order parameter regardless of the memory size.
Also, types of players involved in the game may be recognized using the com-
plexity measure and overall findings support the hypothesis that important
information is contained in the outcomes. Inspired by an analytic expression
for asymptotic complexity we introduce an entropy expression which contains
volatility, a central quantity in the theory of the Minority Game, enabling
links to the exact solution and analytical results [13] .
5 Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by Serbian Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology project OI 1986.
References
[1] A. N. Kolmogorov, Prob. Inf. Transmission 1 (1965) 1.
[2] G. J. Chaitin, J. Assoc. Comput. Machinery 13 (1966) 547.
[3] A. Lempel, J. Ziv, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 22 (1976) 75.
[4] F. Kaspar, H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. A 36 (1987) 842.
[5] D. Challet, Modelling Market Dynamics: Minority Games and Beyond, PhD
Thesis, Univ. de Fribourg (2000).
6
[6] R. Savit, R. Manuca, R. Riolo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82 (1999) 2203.
[7] A. Cavagna, Phys. Rev. E 59 (1999) R3783.
[8] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E 62 (2000) 1862.
[9] J. Ziv, IEEE Trans. Information Theory 24 (1978) 405.
[10] D. Challet, M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E 60 (1999) 6271.
[11] R. Mansilla, Phys. Rev. E 62 (2000) 4553.
[12] M. Rajkovic´, Z. Mihailovic´, in preparation.
[13] M. Marsili, D. Challet, R. Zecchina, Physica A 280 (2000) 522.
7
